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Abstract 
The paper investigates the effects of declining mortality on fertility and income in the standard OLG neoclassical 
growth model under the assumptions of accidental bequests as well as fully annuitised savings. It is shown whether 
and how different countries may expect increasing or decreasing fertility rates under increasing longevity, and argued 
that mortality decline may be another explanation of the Demographic Transition process. In particular, the fact that 
some countries have completed the process while others are entrapped in the second stage may depend on the initial 
level of mortality as well as on differences in technology and preferences. It is also argued that the third stage may not 
necessarily occur in some less developed countries even if their mortality rates converge towards those of 
industrialised countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The current literature views the search for a unified model able to encompass the entire “long 
transition  process,  from  thousands  of  years  of  Malthusian  stagnation  through  the  demographic 
transition to modem growth, as one of the most significant research challenges facing economists 
interested  in  growth  and  development.”(Galor  and  Weil,  1999,  p.  150).  A  brief  historical 
description of the Demographic Transition (DT) may evidence three periods
1: (1) an increase in life 
expectancy, for instance due to advances in medical knowledge; (2) mortality decline associated 
with economic development and, in the early stages, with rising population growth due to both 
reduced mortality and increased fertility rate; (3) declining fertility rate when life expectancy and 
development increase.
2 
The aim of this paper is to study the relationships between adult mortality, fertility and income 
when children are a consumption good and enter their parents’ utility function (e.g. Galor and Weil, 
1996)
3 and the duration of life is uncertain. Although this paper does not present a unified model in 
the sense mentioned above, its value lies in suggesting a simple framework able to capture the main 
aspects of the Demographic Transition, focusing on the crucial role of the increased longevity.
4 
Hence, we address the following important question: is there a theoretical relationship between DT 
and development in the simple neoclassical OLG model in which the reduction in adult mortality 
(the so-called “mortality revolution”)
5 plays a crucial role? 
A  stylised  fact  is  that  while  early-developed  countries  have  all  experienced  a  DT,  developing 
economies are still those that cannot get out of the high-fertility trap. This raises an intriguing 
puzzle: why has DT been completed in some countries and not in others despite the common trend 
towards a worldwide convergence in mortality rates? What causes a country to be persistent in the 
second phase? To answer such questions, we examine how and whether changes in longevity affect 
fertility  behaviour.  Interestingly,  we  show  that short-sighted  behaviour  is  sufficient,  i.e.  a  low 
preference for future consumption, which is typical of some underdeveloped countries, to prevent 
the transition to the third phase of DT, even if the mortality rate would tend to approach that of 
industrialised countries. Therefore our model  makes predictions  in  line with observed cases of 
completed as well as uncompleted DT, depending on the current level of adult mortality, which still 
differs between countries (see for example Tab. A1, in Lorentzen et al., 2008, p. 112). Moreover, it 
argues that the third phase of DT may not be a necessary consequence even in the case of the 
observed  worldwide  downward  trend  of  adult  mortality  with  final  convergence,  especially  as 
regards some less developed countries (LDCs).  
                                                 
1 In a nutshell, demographic transition refers to a shift in demographic behaviour from a state of high birth and death 
rates to a state of low birth and death rates. An equivalent well-known classification (Galor and Weil, 1999; 2000), 
more focused in macroeconomic terms, assumes three distinct regimes that have characterized the process of economic 
development: the "Malthusian Regime," the "Post-Malthusian Regime," and the "Modern Growth Regime." 
2 All the more developed countries have entered this third stage of the demographic transition; by contrast, many 
developing countries only recently began the process. For the sake of precision, a few developed countries have gone 
on to a fourth stage in which death rates exceed birth rates, and the population declines. 
3 We note that in the literature there have been two other approaches to the endogenisation of the fertility decision into 
an economic model. The first, in addition to assuming that children are a consumption good, assumes that either the 
children’s utility or the utility of all the future generations enter their parents’ utility function (Barro and Becker, 1988; 
Becker and Barro, 1988). The second assumes that parents are selfish and that children serve only to provide old age 
support  (Ehrlich  and  Lui,  1991;  Raut  and  Srinivasan,  1994;  Chakrabarti,  1999),  and  thus  seems  more  suited  to 
developing than developed economies. 
4  Fanti and  Gori  (2007) attempt  to  provide  a  further  explanation,  complementary  to  those  already  existing  in  the 
literature and also to the present one, focusing on the effects of a unionization of the economies as a cause of an aspect 
of the DT, namely the emergence of modern fertility behaviour in place of the Malthusian one.  
5 The mortality revolution began in the 1700s in Europe and spread to North America by the mid-1800s when human 
population grew rapidly, not because the birth rate increased, but because the death rate began to fall (the main causal 
factors  are  considered  new  farming  and  transportation  technology  as  well  as  improved  public  health  and  living 
standards owing to increasing economic development). In contrast, in most less developed countries, the mortality 
revolution did not begin in earnest until after World War II.   2 
The distinctive feature of the introduction of longevity in a standard OLG model is the treatment of 
the savings of the deceased persons. There are two polar cases, which obviously also embodying 
intermediate cases: 1) there is a perfect annuity market and all savings are fully annuitized; 2) there 
is no annuity market, for instance as in Abel (1985), so the savings of a deceased person become an 
accidental bequest
6 to his/her child. Interestingly, we show that for whatever assumption on the 
treatment of savings of the deceased, our results hold. To the best of my knowledge, no basic OLG 
model  with  a  preference  for  children  and  exogenous  longevity    arguments,  embodying  both 
assumptions on savings of the deceased, has been studied to explain all these three stages at the 
same time.
7 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general 
model. Sections 3 and 4 derive the results for the cases of fully annuitized savings and accidental 
bequests, respectively, and discuss some implications. Section 5 makes some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The general model 
 
2.1. The firms 
The representative firm acts competitively. The constant returns to scale production function is 
a a - =
1
t t t L AK Y ,
8 where Y , K  and  N L =  are output, capital and the labour input respectively, 
0 > A  is a scale parameter and  ( ) 1 , 0 Î a  is the capital’s weight in technology. The intensive form 
technology of production may be written as 
a
t t Ak y =               (1) 
 with  t t t N K k / :=  and  t t t N Y y / :=  being capital and output per-capita respectively. Assuming 
total depreciation of capital at the end of each period, profit maximisation leads to the following 
marginal conditions:
9   
1
1 - =
- a a t t Ak r ,            (2) 
( )
a a t t Ak w - = 1 .            (3) 
 
2.2. Individuals  
The life of a representative individual is separated into three periods: childhood, young adulthood 
and old age. During childhood individuals do not make decisions. Young adulthood is a working 
period  fixed  with  certainty  and  old  age  is  a  retirement  period  whose  length  is  uncertain.  We 
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the individual is either alive or dead at the beginning of the 
retirement period, with probability p and (1-p) respectively. The wage ( t w ) is used to consume, 
raise children, and save. The cost of child rearing is m for each child, measured in terms of output. 
The labour supply (net of leisure) is constant and normalised to unity. 
                                                 
6 Other major bequest motives are altruism and exchange. While there is no consensus on which bequest motive 
dominates (see, e.g., Altonji et al., 1997), Hurd (1997) argues that bequests are largely accidental. 
7 Although some papers (e.g. Zhang et al., 2001, Yakita, 2001, Strulik, 2003) embody – generally in an endogenous 
growth context  – exogenous longevity and endogenous fertility, they focused on other issues such as growth and social 
security and in any case argued a monotonic relationship between longevity and fertility:  for instance, Strulik (2003), 
who  does  not  consider  the  treatment  of  the  savings  of  the  deceased  persons,  Zhang  et  al.  (2001),  who  consider 
accidental bequests, and Yakita (2001), who considers annuitised savings, state that a rise in longevity always reduces 
fertility. This paper shows that, even in the textbook OLG model and regardless of whether accidental bequests or a 
perfect annuity market is considered, the relationship between fertility and longevity is an inverted U-shape. To the best 
of our knowledge, this result has not so far been pointed out elsewhere. 
8 Adding exogenous growth in labour productivity does not alter any of the substantive conclusions of the model and 
hence it is not included here.  
9 The price of output has been normalised to unity.   3 
The representative agent born at time t chooses saving  and number of children to maximise a 
standard Cobb-Douglas utility function 
t t t n c p c U ln ln ln ) 1 (
2
1
1 f g f + + - = +       (4) 
where 
1
t c   and 
2
1 + t c   are  consumption  in  the  first  and  second  periods,  respectively,  g   is  the 
subjective discount factor and  ) 1 ( f -  and f  are the preference toward first-period consumption 
and the number of children, respectively. 
We  now  further develop the  model, distinguishing the two polar cases of 1) a perfect annuity 
market and 2) unintentional bequests without annuity markets. 
 
3. The model with fully annuitised savings 
 
It is assumed that: i) the private annuity market is competitive and the companies are risk neutral; 
ii) individuals are willing to invest their assets in such insurance companies, given the hypothesis of 
absence of bequests, so that savings are fully annuitised. 
The budget constraint of the young individual is: 
1
t c = t t t s mn w - - ,          (5.1) 
where  t s  are savings. Following a simplified two-period version of the Blanchard (1985) model, as 
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  for  estate  st  accruing  to the  companies,  where  pa  is  the  average  probability;
  2)  the 
probability p is the same for all individuals. Therefore the budget constraint of individuals when old 
is                      













=                   (5.2) 
The standard maximisation of the utility function (4), subject to constraints (5.1) and (5.2), leads to 
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The market-clearing condition in goods as well as in capital markets is expressed as  t t t s k n = +1 . 
Substituting out for  n,  s  and  w from eqs. (3), (6) and (7), the market-clearing condition boils 
down to the following long-run capital per-capita:  
                                                             f g /
* m p k = .                                                       (8) 
                                          
3.1. Steady state analysis 
What are the longevity effects on the long-run rate of fertility? This simple question gives rise to 
interesting findings in our basic OLG model. Making use of (3), (7) and (8) the long-run rate of 
fertility is determined by:   
( ) ( ) [ ]
[ ] g










,        (9) 
and the following propositions holds: 
   4 
Proposition 1. The increase in longevity reduces fertility if and only if 
g a
a
) 1 ( -
> p ; 
Proof: The proof straightforwardly derives from:  
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p n
      (10) 
The simple observation of the condition (10) reveals that the higher the existing longevity, the more 
likely increasing longevity reduces the long-run fertility. 
Simple manipulations of (10) show that the necessary and sufficient condition such that increasing 










 or, alternatively,  in terms of the thriftiness parameter: 




> . The 
latter inequalities suggest that the higher the capital share and the lower the “parsimony”, the more 
likely that an increase in longevity increases the long-run fertility as well. 
 
4. The model with accidental bequests 
 
Since agents do not know when they will die, additional unintentional bequests may occur. If an 
agent dies at the onset of old age (with probability (1-p)), his accumulated savings,  t t s r ) 1 ( 1 + + , are 











=         (11) 
are equally divided among all the young individuals.
10 
The representative agent born at time t maximises the utility function (4) subject to 
    t t t t t b s mn w c + - - =
1         (12) 
    ) 1 ( 1 1
2
+ + + = t t t r s c           (13) 
taking as given bequests from his/her parents, and constraint (3) encompasses the assumption that 
bequests are allocated equally across all members of a generation. 























=           (15) 
In the next section, we examine the steady-state outcome of this model. 
 
4.1. Steady-state analysis 
Making use of (11), (14) and (15) we obtain the steady-state values of bequests,
11 savings and 
fertility, respectively: 
                                                 
10  This  means  that  the  bequest-dependent  wealth  distribution  is  uniform,  as  in  Hubbard  and  Judd  (1987).  This 
assumption allows us to conduct a representative agent analysis and thus to focus more clearly on the effects of changes 
in expected longevity. 
11 Note that while in the models with exogenous fertility bequests are reduced when longevity increases, bringing about 
a reduction in young people’s income and thus reducing savings and further fertility (see eqs. 14 and 15), in the present 
model bequests may either increase or decrease with increasing longevity. 
   5 
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The accumulation equation for per capita capital stock is given by  t t t n s k / 1 = + . By using (17) and 




*         (19) 
By using (2), (3), (18) and (19), the long-run fertility rate is: 
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Proposition  2.  The  increase  in  longevity  reduces  (increases)  fertility  if,  and  only  if, 
g a
g g a a g g ag g a g a a
2
2 2 2 2 3 4
2
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
) (
- - - - + - + + + +
= ° < > p p  
  (22) 
Proof:  The  proof  straightforwardly  derives  from: 
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and thus, resolving for the unique positive value of longevity, p°, it follows that:     












From the observation of (22) or (23) it is easy to see that the lower the thriftiness parameter g, the 
more likely p° is larger than one and thus fertility is never reducing with increasing longevity.  
 
5. An illustration of the main results 
 
The following table illustrates the content of propositions 1 and 2 above, for the parameter set A=2, 
f=0.27, a=0.25, g=0.55, m=0.11 (chosen only for illustrative purposes), showing an inverted U-
shaped relationship between fertility and longevity, for both the assumptions on the savings of the 
deceased persons.   6 
Table 1- Numerical results of the relationships between expected longevity and fertility rates under 
the two alternative treatments of savings of the deceased persons. 
Fertility rate (n)  p=0.25  p=0.40  p=0.50  p=0.60  p=0.70  p=0.80  p=0.90 
Annuitised savings 
case 
1.574  1.651  1.671  1.676  1.672  1.663  1.650 
Accidental 
bequests case 
1.969  1.981  1.948  1.900  1.8401  1.774  1.704 
To shed light on the possible relevance of the “humped” relationship fertility-longevity shown by 
our model, let us imagine that, for the sake of simplicity, the results about such a relationship 
depicted  in  Tab.  1  for  the  case  of  annuitised  savings,  although  only  based  on  an  illustrative 
parameter set, hold for all economies. Such results predict that countries with a probability of adult 
survival  less than about 65% would experience an  increase  in  fertility as a consequence of an 
exogenous reduction  in the adult  mortality rate. Therefore by observing the behaviour of adult 
mortality in the world (see for example Tab. A1, in Lorentzen et al., 2008, p. 112, where the adult 
mortality rate - defined as the probability of a male surviving to age 60, conditional on surviving to 
age 15 - is reported for 160 countries) we may see that for about 53 countries such a rate is less 
than 0.35: therefore this would mean that, with the assumed illustrative parameter set, about one 
third of the world would again be entrapped in the second phase of DT. But our results are again 
more interesting as regards the puzzle of the completed versus uncompleted DT: if some countries 
are  not  sufficiently  “thrifty”  such  as  occurs  in  developing  economies,  then  they  could  never 
complete the Demographic Transition even if their longevity approaches – especially thanks to 
pervasive  medical  improvements  -  that  of  the  advanced  countries  which  completed  such  a 
transition. Indeed, it is easy to show that for sufficiently low values of the parameter g the relation 
of fertility rates to longevity could always be positive (rather than inverted U-shaped). This means 
that economies with too many parsimonious individuals may always be prevented from entering the 
third stage of DT. The intuition is as follows. First, while a mortality decline incentives capital 
accumulation and hence wages, it makes it convenient to increase old age consumption in place of 
raising children. Therefore, when individuals are sufficiently short-sighted or parsimonious, the 
result  is  that  the  (Malthusian)  income  effect  of  higher  wages  on  fertility  is  greater  than  the 
substitution effect between (fewer) children and (more) old age consumption, leading to a positive 
relationship between fertility and longevity. 
 
5.1. Mortality revolution and the demographic transition process  
We note that the model above is able to depict not only the DT in strict sense, but also the three 
stages of the process of demo-economic development once endowed with the usual relationship 
between longevity and income, which is commonly thought to have a bi-directional causal nexus: 
on one side, from eqs. 1, 8 and 19 our model predicts an equilibrium relationship indicated by a 
monotonic increasing function y=f(p), while, on the other, it is usual to assume the (monotonic or 
non) increasing function p=F(y) (e.g. Strulik, 2003, Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002, Kalemli and 
Ozcan, 2002). By using the system consisting in (1), either (9) or (20), either (8) or (19), and 
p=F(y), it would be a trivial exercise to exemplify the transition, after a shift of the intercept and/or 
of the slope of the function F,
12 towards the new modern equilibrium through the three stages 
described in the introduction. A “mortality revolution” owing to an exogenous event rather than to 
the effect of economic growth seems to be the case of many developing countries; thus the process 
triggered by a shift in the longevity function, as depicted above, might occur in those countries 
                                                 
12 Such a shift may be thought of as an exogenous event which permits, ceteris paribus for output, a reduction in adult 
mortality:  for  instance,  among  others,  cooked  instead  of  raw  foods,  improvements  in  medical  know-how,  climate 
changes, a reduction in wars and murders, and so on.   7 
which have not so far experienced the DT.
13 We believe that a model as parsimonious as possible, 
such as that in the present paper, is able to provide, without embarking on additional assumptions, 




We investigated the effects of declining mortality on fertility and income in the standard OLG 
neoclassical  growth  model,  arguing  that  mortality  decline  may  be  another  explanation  of  the 
demographic transition process. In particular, the present model predicts the economic conditions 
necessary for the occurrence of the third phase of the DT. For instance, increasing longevity goes 
hand in hand with decreasing fertility only if the thriftiness is sufficiently high: countries with more 
“cicadas” than “ants” might not complete the third stage of the DT. It is worth noting that short-
sighted  behaviour  may  be  correlated  with  underdevelopment  of  financial  markets  as  well  as 
insufficient financial education of people.
14 This reinforces the probability that many developing 
countries are prevented from entering the third stage. These results shed new light on the issue of 
why some countries may undergo a “mortality revolution” without completing the third stage of 
DT. 
These  results  complement  those  obtained  by  the  growing  literature  on  fertility,  long-run 
development of economies and the transition from a pre-industrial to post-industrial world (see, 
e.g., Nelson, 1956, Becker and Barro, 1988; Kremer, 1993, Raut and Srinivasan, 1994, Tamura, 
1996,  Galor  and  Weil,  1996,  2000,  Galor,  2005).  Given  their  simplicity,  we  believe  that,  by 
resorting  to  a,  loosely  speaking,  Occam’s  razor-type  reasoning,  they  offer  a  probably  simple 
explanation of the somewhat intricate DT process. 
The interest of these results lies in their robustness, in that they hold under the assumptions of 
accidental bequests and fully annuitised savings, and in the simplicity with which are obtained, that 
is within a standard OLG model. They also show how and whether different countries may expect 
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